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ABSTRACT
Within the past two decades, a variety of specialized sex offender legislation has been
implemented across the United States. Typically brought about in attempt to ebb the
societal disquiet after notorious sexual assault cases are sensationalized in the media,
these policies appear to be based on faulty assumptions, and lack any evidence-based
foundation. In fact, empirical research suggests that policies such as sex offender
registration, community notification, and residence restrictions do little to prevent sexual
offending, and may actually work to increase the risk of these events through a number of
collateral consequences. The current study critically examines the rationale of sex
offender laws, and particularly considers the outcomes of the residence restriction that
was implemented in South Carolina in 2011. Utilizing data from the South Carolina sex
offender registry, I found that, at least in the current analysis, the residence restriction did
not increase rates of homelessness or recidivism. I did, however, find support for a
positive association between homelessness and recidivism. Implications and future
directions are discussed.
.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When an individual is convicted of a serious crime in the United States, they are
often sentenced to serve a term of incarceration, typically for the purpose of punishment,
treatment, and/or supervision. In most circumstances, when the individual has completed
his/her sentence, or paid their debt to society, so to speak, he/she is essentially free to
reintegrate back into society, and move on. There is a particular group of offenders,
however, who face continued punishment long after a sentence has been completed, often
for the remainder of their lives. These extra measures can make reintegrating back into
society, and moving on with one’s life, extremely difficult, if not impossible. These postcorrectional sanctions are commonly justified as an attempt to prevent recidivism among
this specific group. Interestingly, there is no evidence to suggest this group reoffends at a
greater rate than other offenders. In fact, research has shown that they tend to reoffend
significantly less (Durose, Cooper, & Snyder, 2014; Lancaster, 2011). So, why does this
group get such exceptional treatment? Because they are sex offenders.
Offenses of a sexual nature have long been viewed by the criminal justice system,
and by society in general, as a unique group of especially egregious crimes deserving of
unique legislation. On the surface, this may seem reasonable. Often, when people think of
the term “sex offender” they think of brutal rapists and malevolent child molesters. In
reality, the average person labeled as a sex offender in the U.S. is quite different from this
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stereotype (Snyder, 2000). The wide variety of registrable offenses across jurisdictions in
the U.S., from public urination, to prostitution, to consensual teenage sex, for example,
has caused this population to grow quickly and become increasingly diverse. At the same
time, notorious cases of violent sexual offenses have heightened societal disquiet, urging
lawmakers to react by developing unique legislation for these types of crimes.
Unfortunately, these laws tend to be based on faulty assumptions rather than empirical
evidence, and fail to account for the composition of this group of offenders, and what
factors impact their risk of recidivism. Investigations of the outcomes of such legislation
indicate that these laws typically do not reduce sexual offending, and in fact have resulted
in an array of adverse collateral consequences (Adkins, Huff, Stageberg, Prell & Musel,
2000; Letourneau, Levenson, Bandyopadhyay, Sinha, & Armstrong, 2010; Sandler,
Freeman & Socia, 2008; Schram & Meloy, 2005; Tewksbury, Jennings & Zgoba, 2012;
Zgoba, Witt, Dalessandro & Veysey, 2008).
One of the most troubling unintended outcomes of specialized sex offender
legislation is increased rates of homelessness among this population (Barnes, Dukes,
Tewksbury & De Troy 2009; Berenson & Appelbaum 2011; Chajewski & Mercado,
2008; Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Socia, 2011; Tewksbury, 2005; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000;
Zgoba, Levenson & McKee 2009). Homelessness is an especially important issue to
consider, as it has been identified as a strong risk factor for offending (Hanson & Harris,
2000; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005; Halsey, 2007). This relationship,
however, appears yet to be tested among registered sex offenders specifically. If these
laws do indeed result in increased rates of homelessness, and the relationship between
homelessness and recidivism holds true for registered offenders, then such laws are
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effectively working to increase offending among this group, rather than decrease it. The
current research will explore how South Carolina’s sex offender residence restriction law
impacts rates of homelessness among the state’s registered sex offender population, as
well as investigate whether the relationships between homelessness and recidivism exists
within this group. Answering these questions will help gain a better understanding of how
the current sex offender laws affect rates of recidivism among registered offenders, and
can help guide policy makers in developing evidence based policy to prevent these
horrible events.
This thesis will begin by briefly outlining the history of the legislation that
surrounds sex offender registration, identifying which crimes are registerable, who are
committing these crimes, and finally outlining the specialized legislation individuals face
once they are required to register. Section 1.3 will discuss the rationale of these laws,
identify their underlying assumptions, and consider the empirical research that counters
those assumptions. Section 1.4 will review the literature on past investigations of sex
offender legislation, focusing specifically on how they affect recidivism, what collateral
consequences have been discovered, and the implications of those collateral
consequences. Finally, section 1.5 will outline and discuss the sex offender residence
restriction law that was implemented in South Carolina in 2011, which is the focus of the
current study.
1.1 SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION
Legislative History. Across the U.S., law enforcement agencies have long
maintained records of convicted offenders, but California created the first registration
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program specific to sex offenders in 1947 (Penal Code of the State of California, 1947).
Several states followed suit in the subsequent decades as a series of heinous attacks on
children received extensive media coverage, and prompted the legislature to act to ebb
the resulting societal disquiet (Maguire & Singer, 2010). In 1990, Washington state
began notifying the public of dangerous sexual offenders, making it the first state to make
information from the registry publicly available (Easterly, 2015). Federal legislation on
sex offender registries first appeared in 1994, five years after the never-solved abduction
of 11-year-old Jacob Wetterling. To assist in identifying and ruling out potential suspects
in sex crime investigations, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Act required all states to create sex offender registries accessible to law
enforcement agencies (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 17
U.S.C §§ 170101-170303).
Shortly after the Wetterling Act was passed, news outlets across the country were
reporting on the rape and murder of a 7-year-old girl in New Jersey, Megan Kanka (New
York Times, 1994; Quindlen, 1994). The perpetrator was a neighbor who, unbeknownst to
Megan’s parents, had a previous conviction for the attempted sexual assault of another
child. Megan’s parents argued that if they had been aware that a convicted sex offender
was living nearby, they could have taken measures to protect their child (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1998). Shortly thereafter, federal legislation, aptly named Megan’s
Law, was passed requiring public dissemination of the information from the state
registries established by the Wetterling Act (Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 2 U.S.C § 20417).
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Additional federal laws followed over several more years, setting further
guidelines for registration and community notification, culminating in 2006 with the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, named after yet another child victim of a
sexual offense (Easterly, 2015). The Act contains the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) as its first title. SORNA and the other titles in the Walsh Act
were intended to streamline the tracking of sex offenders and notification requirements at
the federal level (Vásquez, 2008). SORNA also mandated the creation of a national sex
offender registry, now imposing rules on states, under the threat of losing federal crime
prevention funds, to bring uniformity of information available on state sex offender
registry websites (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 119).
Additionally, it expanded the federal requirements of who must register as a sex offender,
defining a sex offense as a “criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or
sexual contact with another” (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1
U.S.C § 111).
SORNA classifies sex offenders into one of three tiers based on the severity of the
offense for which they were convicted, rather than on their individual risk for re-offense.
(Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 111) Tier 3 is reserved
for offenders whose offense is comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual contact, and involves kidnapping of a minor. An
offender is also classified as Tier 3 for committing any offense after being registered as a
Tier 2 offender. Tier 2 is for offenders whose offense is comparable to or more severe
than the following offenses: sex trafficking; coercion and enticement; transportation with
intent to engage in criminal activity; abusive sexual contact; and involves the use of a
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minor in a sexual performance; solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution, or
production or distribution of child pornography. An offender is also classified as Tier 2
for committing any offense after becoming a Tier 1 offender. Offenders are classified as
Tier 1 when they do not meet criteria for either Tier 2 or Tier 3.
SORNA sets a number of additional requirements for the management of sex
offenders including, but not limited to, the following:
•

Tier 3 offenders are required to update their whereabouts every three
months for life, those in Tier 2 are required to update their whereabouts
every six months for 25 years, and those in Tier 1 are required to update
their whereabouts every year for 15 years (Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 113, 115)

•

states are required to publicly disclose information about all Tier 2 and
Tier 3 offenders (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1
U.S.C § 121)

•

sex offenders who were 14 years of age or older are required to register if
they were convicted of a Tier 3 offense, or if they were tried as an adult,
regardless of the offense (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 111)

•

kidnapping and false imprisonment of a child, regardless of sexual intent,
are registerable offenses (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, 1 U.S.C § 111)
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•

offenders are required to register in not only the jurisdiction in which they
live, but also those in which they work or attend school (Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 113)

•

failure to register is classified as a felony offense, punishable by up to 10
years in prison (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1
U.S.C § 122)

•

sex offenders are required to report a change of address to law
enforcement within 3 days of relocation (Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 113)

•

the law will be applied retroactively, meaning that any individual who
was convicted of a registerable offense before the Act was passed, is still
required to register (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, 1 U.S.C § 129)

Unsurprisingly, the constitutionality of sex offender registration laws has been
argued in courts across the country. For example, in 2002, a convicted sex offender in
Connecticut filed suit in Federal court, claiming the state’s requirement of public
disclosure of information on sex offenders after release from incarceration violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v.
Doe, 2003). The Court of Appeals confirmed, concluding that such disclosure did indeed
violate the Fourteenth Amendment since registrants were not provided with a hearing
prior to the public disclosure. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct in ordering the
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public disclosure of Connecticut’s sex offender registry. In a unanimous decision, the
Second Circuit Court’s judgement was reversed on the basis that due process does not
require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statute
(Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 2003). Moreover, the retroactive application
of the law was also fought against in Smith v. Doe (2003) in Alaska. In this case, John
Does I and II were convicted of aggravated assault before the act’s passage and filed suit,
claiming the act was punitive and violated the ex post facto clause of Article I of the U.S.
Constitution. The district court ruled against the plaintiffs, claiming that the act was
nonpunitive. The appeals court, however, sided with the plaintiffs, agreeing that the act
was in fact punitive and violated the ex post facto clause. The Supreme Court held the
original ruling, stating that because the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act is intended
to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil, it is nonpunitive. Therefore, the act’s retroactive
application does not violate the ex post facto clause (Smith v. Doe, 2003).
I have provided only a brief overview of the history of legislation on sex offender
management, but it provides adequate reference for the context of the current project.
Below, I describe how these federal guidelines have been expanded upon and what
current state laws and local ordinances entail.
Current Legislation. The original purpose of sex offender registries was to serve
as a management strategy for adult sex offenders who were deemed high risk to the
community, but the scope of the laws has drastically expanded over time resulting in very
broad and inclusive policies that have impacts well beyond their original intention. The
Walsh Act sets federal guidelines for registration, and identifies which types of offenses
are registerable. It does not, however, limit the authority of states to go beyond federal
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law. As a result, many states and local jurisdictions have established laws that exceed the
federal recommendations. Seventeen states require lifelong registration for all offenders
convicted of a sexual offense (Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia; Tofte & Fellner, 2007), and all but 32 states
enforce community notification on all offenders, regardless of tier or severity of the
offense (Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin; Tofte & Fellner, 2007). Most troubling has been the expansion of states’
definitions of registerable offenses. Many sex offender registries now include individuals
whose offenses are nonviolent, and in some cases, not even related to sexual activity. For
example, in some jurisdictions registerable offenses include public urination, streaking,
taking nude (or even semi-nude) photos of oneself (if you are a minor), and engaging in
consensual prostitution (U.S. Department of Justice - Office of Justice Programs, 2012).
Despite the low risk these individuals pose to others, they suffer the same stigmatization
and severe restrictions on their activities and as those placed on violent offenders.
This expansion of registerable offenses resulted in individuals having to register
for a multitude of unfortunate reasons. One of the most commonly reported situations is
that of consensual teenage sex or other sexual exploration by and with a minor. For
example, when Wendy Whitaker of Georgia was 17 years old, she performed consensual
oral sex on a 15-year-old classmate. For this act, Whitaker was arrested, charged with
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sodomy, sentenced to five years of probation, and required to register as a sex offender
(Economist, 2009). Most child behavior experts agree that sexual experimentation is a
normal part of a young person’s development (Campagna & Martin, 2007). By age 14,
more than a third of youth report genital play with another youth under the age of 18, and
one fifth have engaged in sexual intercourse (Chantala & Tabor, 1999). By age 16, over
40% of both males and females report engaging in intercourse, and that number increases
to 55% by age 17 (Chantala & Tabor, 1999). Every state in the U.S. criminalizes sexual
activity with someone below the age of consent, but at least 39 states have legislative
exceptions to these laws (i.e. Romeo and Juliet laws) to lessen or eliminate criminal
penalties for young people close in age who engaged in non-coercive sex (Schwartz,
2014). Indeed, SORNA specifies that the law exempts consensual sex when the victim
was at least 13 and the offender was no more than four years older (Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 111). Even with these exceptions, many
teenagers remain at risk for being labeled as sex offenders for engaging in sexual conduct
that is legal for adults. At least 28 states require sex offender registration for anyone
convicted of having consensual sex with another teenager if the offender was either age
17, or two years older than the other party (Tofte & Fellner, 2007; Young, 2008).
Additionally, 11 states have no exceptions to the statutory rape laws which means that
any consensual sexual activity between minors can result in conviction and sex offender
registration (Tofte & Fellner, 2007).
Other forms of sexual exploration among minors have also led to criminal
convictions and sex offender registration. For example, 10-year-old Leah DuBuc was
charged with eight counts of criminal sexual conduct, in the first and second degree, for
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exposing herself and mimicking sexual behaviors she had seen in movies with her stepbrothers (Stillman, 2016). This is not an uncommon occurrence. In fact, the National
Center on Sexual Behavior of Youth, a program of the Office of Juvenile Justice
Programs, reports that adolescent sex offenders, not unlike the example above, account
for a third of reported sex offenses against children (NCSBY, 2007), and research
suggests that approximately 40% of offenders against children up to the age of 11 are
children themselves (Snyder, 2000). A detailed examination of the population of
registered sex offenders in the U.S. reveals that nearly a quarter of all sexual assault
offenders were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense, and 16% were under the
age of 12 (Snyder, 2000). In fact, “the single age with the greatest number of offenders
from the perspective of law enforcement [is] age 14” (Snyder, 2000, p.8). Arguments
have been made that such activities among young people are indicative of future sex
offending as an adult. Research on the rates of sexual recidivism among these young
offenders, however, suggest that over 95% of those convicted of a sexual offense as a
minor do not commit additional sex crimes later in life (Vandiver, 2006; Leidecke &
Marbibi, 2000).
The expanding definition of “sex offender” has also led to many adults being
placed on the sex offender registry for non-violent or non-sexual offenses. In some
jurisdictions, individuals have been required to register as a sex offender for engaging in
consensual prostitution (Dewey, 2012). Several others require registration for public
urination, and there are at least 32 states in which exposing genitals in public is a
registerable offense (Silver, 2013). This means that a homeless person urinating outside,
or someone streaking at a sporting event, or mooning a crowd as a prank can be forced to
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register as a sex offender. In fact, in Oklahoma alone, there are 600 sex offenders on the
sex offender registry for indecent exposure (Killman, 2005).
Determining the actual act that led to an individual becoming registered can be
difficult, if not impossible, making it a challenge to assert how many individuals on the
registry did indeed commit a violent offense, and how many were forced to register for
something possibly less threatening or harmful. For instance, most registries simply cite
the statute under which the offender was convicted, and although “criminal sexual
conduct in the fourth degree” certainly sounds as though it could describe a sexually
violent act, it was also the charge one man was convicted of when he “groped a 29-yearold woman at a clothing-optional music festival” (Slater, 2005). Though this man’s
behavior was unacceptable, it seems unreasonable to deem him a dangerous sex offender.
Overall, SORNA, and its expansions across state and local level jurisdictions,
have drastically increased the registered sex offender population. In 1996, there were
185,000 sex offenders listed on sex offender registries nationwide (Matson & Lieb,
1996). By 2016, that number had increased to 859,500 (National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, 2016). This increase is not due to increased convictions of truly
violent sexual offenders who pose a great threat to society, but rather due to the
conviction of children innocently exploring their sexuality, and adults who may have
played a prank by streaking or mooning, or engaged in prostitution. Homeless individuals
are especially at risk as they often do not have a reliable location to use the bathroom, and
choosing to relieve oneself in an alley or other public location could result in a conviction
of indecent exposure. The reality is that the number of registered sex offenders continues

12

to grow, but the threat that these offenders pose to the public does not warrant the drastic
measures they become subject to.
If former offenders simply had to register their whereabouts with law
enforcement, the adverse consequences for them would likely be minimal. Along with
registration, however, comes a multitude of policies that govern the lives of released sex
offenders. In addition to the regulations and guidelines SORNA specifies on registration,
it also lays out rules for community notification. Additionally, many state and local level
jurisdictions have implemented additional laws unique to those on the sex offender
registry, such as, GPS monitoring, limited technology use, and restricting where an
offender may reside, work, or be physically present (Liptak, 2017; Terry, 2015).
Essentially, registering as a sex offender requires you to follow a whole new set of rules,
even after your correctional sentence is complete.
Community notification is the most common consequence of being registered as a
sex offender. In addition to mandating that information on Tier 2 and Tier 3 offenders be
publicly disclosed by the state (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1
U.S.C § 121), SORNA also necessitated the creation of a publicly available national sex
offender registry compiling each state’s registry information, thus making details about
previously convicted offenders available to anyone, anywhere, without restriction (Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 1 U.S.C § 119). Since SORNA did not
specify the means by which states must disclose information, community notification
requirements vary across jurisdictions. Some require only passive notification, most
typically via an online website, while others require active notification, which may
include special bulletins, posting flyers, community meetings, or door-to-door
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notification (Lytle, 2015). Moreover, some states apply notification requirements based
on the Tier categories, while others enforce notification equally on all those registered
(Lytle, 2015). Some courts and legislators have sought to notify the public about the
presence of sex offenders through means that could deliberately expose the offender to
public humiliation, degradation, and even danger. A court in Georgia, for example,
ordered one registrant to put up signs on his property declaring that he is a child molester
(State v. Jordan, 1998). Lawmakers in other states have proposed requiring registrants to
obtain color-coded license plates, identifying them as a sex offender (Yung, 2009). Also
of note, with very few exceptions, states do not impose any “need to know” limitations
on who has access to registrants’ information, or what information is available.
Information on the registry typically includes not only a person’s name and criminal
conviction, but also his or her address, photograph, physical description, date of birth,
and sometimes his or her vehicle make and model, license plate number, and place of
employment (Lytle, 2015).
The terminology of the laws and language utilized by online registries does not
provide useful information describing the actual conduct of the offense (e.g., “indecent
liberties with a child,” “lewd and lascivious behavior,” or “crime against nature”), often
leading the public to perceive the offenses as stereotypical. Moreover, the dangerousness
of an offender is often difficult to determine from the available information. The online
registries of 22 states and the District of Columbia contain no discernible indication of
dangerousness of the offender (McPherson, 2016). Other state registries utilize various
strategies for communicating this information; nine indicate how long the offender is
required to register; two indicate that they include only “high level offenders”; five
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include a section describing the offense in detail; seven use the terms “aggravated” or
“habitual” to define more dangerous offenders; two have a separate database for medium
risk and high risk offenders and 15 designate some offenders as “sexual predators” or
“sexually violent predators” (McPherson, 2016).
A second sex offender management strategy gaining popularity in recent decades
across the U.S. are policies that restrict where a sex offender can reside (Socia, 2014).
Though there is no federal legislation guiding these policies, at least 30 states have laws
restricting where a sex offender can live, and nearly all other states enforce such
restrictions with local ordinances or by practice of the courts, parole, or probation
departments (Meloy, Miller, & Curtis, 2008). Although these policies differ from one
jurisdiction to the next, they typically prohibit sex offenders from living within a certain
distance of schools, daycare centers, parks, and other places where children congregate
(Lobanov-Rostovsky, 2015). The first state-wide sex offender residence restrictions
(SORR) were implemented in the states of Florida and Delaware in 1995, presumably
motivated by the creation of Megan’s Law in 1994. Though several states followed suit
shortly afterward, 40% of state legislations on SORR were passed between 2005 and
2007 – the two years following the highly-publicized killings of two young girls in two
unrelated events by two separate convicted sex offenders (Meloy, Miller, & Curtis,
2008). This pattern exemplifies the notion that these specialized sex offender laws are
more impulsive reactions serving as a quick fix to public alarm, rather than an
empirically based solution to reduce the occurrence of sexual violence.
Residence restrictions have been described as possibly the harshest and most
arbitrary of the laws targeting sex offenders (Socia, 2014). Sex offenders are effectively
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banished from their already established homes, kept from living with their families, and
oftentimes, when there are no available housing options outside of exclusion zones, they
are forced to live in isolated rural areas, away from employment opportunities, public
transportation, and social services – sometimes even mandated treatment. In worst case
scenarios, they are left homeless.
SORR legislation varies in a number of ways across jurisdictions. Specifically,
states differ in regard to which groups of sex offenders are subject to residence
restrictions. Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin, for example, only enforce residence restrictions on sex offenders who are on
some form of community-based supervision (Meloy et al., 2008). Nevada and West
Virginia further limit the group subject to residence restrictions to those being supervised
for a minimum of 10 years (Meloy et al., 2008). State legislations also diverge on the
ages of registered sex offenders who are subject to residence restrictions. While many
states apply residence restrictions to adult offenders only, 20% apply residence
restrictions to both adult and juvenile offenders (Socia, 2015). Interestingly, even though
these laws were implemented to keep sex offenders away from children, all but nine
states enforce residence restrictions on offenders whose victims were adults in addition to
those whose victims were children (McPherson, 2016; Socia, 2015).
In addition to differences in to whom the laws apply, SORRs also differ in the
nature and scope of the restriction boundaries, and exclusion zones. A content analysis of
each state’s legislation by Meloy and colleagues (2008) indicates that the least restrictive
zones were 500 to 999 feet, the most common restriction size was 1,000 to 1,500 feet,
and the largest exclusion zones ranged from 1,501 to 2000 feet. The analysis also
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uncovered that the most common area from which sex offenders were restricted was
schools, but numerous other areas were also restricted in certain legislations. In Georgia,
for example, sex offenders were prohibited from coming within 1,000 feet of schools –
public, private, elementary, and secondary – daycare centers, parks, playgrounds, school
bus stops, recreation facilities, churches, skating rinks, gymnasiums, and any facility that
provides programs or services to minors (O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12). In Alabama, the victim’s
home and homes of any immediate family members of the victim are also considered
restricted zones (AL Code § 15-20A-11). The severity of offenses associated with
violating residence restrictions also varies across jurisdictions (Mustain, 2014). The most
common penalty is a felony charge, but some states penalize with a misdemeanor (with
and without mandatory jail terms), while others charge either a misdemeanor or a felony,
depending on the original offense. Of those jurisdictions that limit the restrictions to those
on parole or probation, most cite violations of community-based sanctions, including a
potential revocation of parole or probation that could result in re-incarceration (Mustain,
2014).
Aside from registration, community notification, and residence restrictions,
individuals who commit a sexual offense may be subjected to several additional
sanctions. Title III of the Walsh Act, mandates civil commitment for certain dangerous
offenders (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 3 U.S.C § 301). The
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of indefinite civil commitment for these
offenders in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), although judges in Minnisota (Karsjens et al., v.
Jesson et al., 2015) and Missouri (Van Orden et al., v. Schafer et al., 2015) have ruled
that such practices are unconstitutional. Additionally, Title IV prohibits registered sex
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offenders from sponsoring a family member for permanent residency in the U.S. (Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 4 U.S.C § 402). Furthermore, a federal
appeals court recently determined it was not unconstitutional for local ordinances to
require lifelong use of GPS monitoring for certain offenders (Blake, 2016; Belleau v.
Wall et al., 2016). Additionally, many local ordinances that began as residence
restrictions are now expanding to forbid sex offenders from working, walking through, or
even being physically present in any capacity, in the exclusion zones (Meloy et al., 2008).
It is undeniable that sexual violence is a dreadful and significant problem in this
country. Legislation to prevent acts of sexual violence, both federal and local, has
typically arisen from public pressure following highly-publicized occurrences of sexual
assault on a minor. The fact that so many of these laws are named after child victims is
indicative of their emotional nature and undermines the importance of their fairness and
effectiveness. Indisputably, the government should be taking steps to reduce the rates of
sexual offending, but legislation that is developed impulsively and without stringent
consideration of empirical research is unlikely to result in the desired outcomes. Indeed,
after the passage of the Adam Walsh Act in 2006, the population of sex offenders in the
U.S. grew exponentially because of the expansion of registerable offenses, not a sudden
increase in predatory offending. Now, instead of providing the police with a means of
tracking violent and dangerous individuals, the sex offender registry is filled with both
children and adults that pose very little risk to the public. Once an individual becomes a
registered sex offender, they face a plethora of penalties including community
notification and residence restrictions that were originally intended to protect us from the
most threatening members of our society, but now mostly stand in the way of people
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trying to successfully reintegrate back into society. The next section discusses how the
rationale behind the legislation introduced here stands largely in contrast to empirical
research on sex offenders. Following that, I review the empirical literature with regards to
the outcomes, both intended and otherwise, of sex offender registration, notification, and
residence restrictions.
1.2 LEGISLATION RATIONALE
Recently, criminal justice policy makers throughout the country have taken steps
to utilize the large body of evidence-based literature to inform current policies, such as
various rehabilitation programs, mandatory arrest for domestic violence, and treatment
programs for juveniles (see Andrews & Bonta, 2006; Aos, Miller & Drake, 2006). This
represents an ongoing shift away from the more punitive-based correctional policies that
did not result in desired increases in public safety. By creating evidence-based policies,
the potential to maximize resources and public safety outcomes is drastically enhanced.
Despite these advances in evidence-based policies in the broader criminal justice field,
such a movement has not yet taken hold with respect to sex offender-specific policies
(see Levenson & D’Amora, 2007). The various pieces of sex offender legislation outlined
in the previous chapter were each implemented with specific goals. Sex offender
registration is meant to help law enforcement track individuals previously convicted of a
sexual offense to aid in criminal investigations. Community notification is meant to
enable parents and other individuals to protect themselves and their children against
known sex offenders. Residence restrictions are meant to reduce sex offenders’ access to
potential victims. These laws and their purposes may appear logical on the surface, but
empirical evidence on sex offenders and their patterns of offending generally contradicts
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the objectives of these laws. This section will identify the assumptions these policies are
based on, outline how these assumptions diverge from the empirical literature, and
discuss the implications of these beliefs.
The notion that rates of sexual victimization are high and increasing, that sex
offenders typically victimize strangers, and that recidivism is high among sex offenders
in general, and indeed higher than that of other offenders, are widely held assumptions
among the general public (Levenson, Brannon, Fortney, & Baker, 2007; Sample &
Kadleck, 2008). The data, however, do not support any of these beliefs. Incidence and
prevalence trends indicate that sexual crimes are declining alongside other types of
violent crimes, and have been for quite some time (FBI, 2009; Sinozich & Langton,
2014; Truman & Morgan, 2015). Between 1993 and 2005, the rate of reported rape and
sexual assault decreased by nearly 70% for adult victims (Catalano, 2005), and by 53%
for child victims between 1992 and 2006 (Finkelhor, Hammer, & Sedlak, 2008). These
numbers have remained relatively stable over the past decade with the U.S. Bureau of
Justice statistics reporting that the prevalence rate of sexual assault was .08 in 2015
(Truman & Morgan, 2015). Moreover, crime victimization surveys indicate that rape and
sexual assault account for less than 4% of all violent crimes (Catalano, 2005; Truman &
Langton, 2013).
Regarding the assumption of “stranger danger”, sexual victimization data reveals
that a large majority of sexual offense victims are abused by persons known to them
(Snyder & Sickmund, 2006; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2006; Petrosino & Pertrosino, 1999),
and that violence committed by a stranger has been decreasing since 2004 (Truman &
Langton, 2013). In fact, for victims under the age of 18, up to almost 90% of perpetrators
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are individuals known by the victim such as relatives, friends, baby-sitters, teachers, and
other persons in positions of authority (Maguire & Singer, 2010).
Finally,

research

indicates

that

observed

recidivism

rates,

although

underestimated due to under-detection and under-reporting, are likely much lower than
the public believes them to be (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005; Hood, Shute, Felizer,
& Wilcox, 2002). In fact, nearly 90% of individuals arrested for a sexual crime have no
history of sexual offending (Greenfeld, 1997). Recidivism estimates are impacted by a
number of factors including the length of follow up period and definition of recidivism
(i.e., re-arrest, reconviction, or re-incarceration; inclusion of parole violations, etc.). This
can result in a vast array of estimates; however, most researchers suggest recidivism rates
are somewhere between 3-24%, which is lower than overall rates of recidivism for
offenders in general (Greenfeld, 1997; Harris & Hanson, 2004; Kruttschnitt, Uggen, &
Shelton, 2000; Zimring, Piquero, & Jennings 2007). While this number is certainly not
trivial, it does suggest that the clear majority of sex offenders do not reoffend.
Additionally, recidivism rates seem to vary greatly depending on the original type of
offense. Generally, those who commit crimes against minors recidivate much less than
those committing rape and other offenses against adults (Harris & Hanson, 2004).
Recidivism rates of sex offenders have also been found to be lower than that of other
offenders, a finding that holds true for both adults (Harris & Hanson, 2004; Kruttschnitt,
Uggen, & Shelton, 2000) and juveniles (Zimring, Piquero, & Jennings 2007).
Additionally, sex offenders do not appear to be a “specialized” group of offenders; those
who do re-offend, are unlikely to commit an additional sexual offense (Sample & Bray,
2003; Miethe, Olson, & Mitchell, 2006). Indeed, one study suggests that sex offending
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may be best understood as a transitory phase in an offender’s life (Lussier & Davis,
2011).
Unfortunately, these flawed perceptions regarding sexual offenders and offenses
appear to have played a substantial role in the development of current sex offender
legislation. Registration and community notification policies are based on the notion that
a sex offender is a special type of dangerous offender who is highly likely to reoffend,
which, as outlined above, is not supported by the literature (Greenfeld, 1997; Harris &
Hanson, 2004; Kruttschnitt, Uggen, & Shelton, 2000; Zimring, Piquero, & Jennings
2007). Furthermore, for such policies to be effective, those responsible for sex offenses
would have to be on the registries and subject to community notification. The data
suggests, however, that those who engage in serious sexual offenses would not have been
eligible for registration or notification prior to the offense that lead to their conviction
(Petrosino & Petrosino, 1999). This is due, in part, to the fact that they often are first time
offenders, or because their offenses were not “predatory-stranger” crimes. Many victims
of sex offenders are related to their offender, and in most other cases, a pre-existing
relationship was present between the offender and the victim (Petrosino & Petrosino,
1999).
Like registration and community notification, faulty assumptions appear to be the
basis of sex offender residence restrictions. Residence restrictions are intended to
eliminate sex offenders’ access to potential victims through geographical lines. The
rationale for these policies is that children tend to be victimized outside the home, and
that they are victimized by strangers; therefore, sexual victimization of children will
decrease if sex offenders are not in proximity to specific locations. Once again, this
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approach ignores what is known about sexual offending. In fact, only 12% of all reported
cases of sexual assault involved offenders who were unknown to the victim (Truman &
Langton, 2013). For sexual assault victims under the age of 18, the perpetrator was a
family member or acquaintance 93% of the time (Snyder, 2000).
Research has robustly illustrated the faulty logic of residence restrictions. Duwe,
Donnay and Tewksbury (2008) analyzed data on all sex offenders who were released and
later re-incarcerated for an additional sex offense over a span of 12 years in Minnesota.
The analysis showed that 79% of the offenders knew the victim prior to the offense.
Furthermore, 85% of the reoffenses occurred in a residential location and 39% occurred
outside the home, with only 9% taking place within one mile of the offender’s residence.
Of these 9%, just three offenders made contact with a victim at a restricted location. Two
of the three, however, were not in proximity to where they lived, and the third involved
an adult victim. The authors concluded that not one of the 224 sex offenses analyzed
would have been prevented by residence restrictions on the offenders (Duwe, Donnay, &
Tewksbury, 2008). Using archived data on almost 1,500 sex offenders, Calkins,
Colombino, Matsuura, and Jeglic (2015) made a similar discovery. In their study, 4% of
sex offenses occurred in areas that would be restricted by residence restrictions.
However, less than 0.5% of the offenses were perpetrated by a stranger against a minor
victim within a restricted location. Findings such as these undermine the main rationale
behind residence restrictions that sex offenders are likely to recidivate by identifying
potential victims near their homes.
Moreover, research has failed to provide any evidence that residential proximity
to schools or parks is related to reoffending (Maguire & Singer, 2010; Zandbergen,
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Levenson, & Hart, 2010). In fact, one study found that to avoid recognition, sex offenders
were more likely to seek victims from a neighborhood other than where they lived
(Minnesota Department of Corrections, 2003). Other research indicates that parks and
schools are among the least common locations where offenders meet their victims
(Maguire & Singer, 2010).
Faulty beliefs about sex offenders have evidently resulted in laws that have no
grounding in empirical evidence. These beliefs about sex offenders have also been used
to justify such laws, when their constitutionality is debated in court. In Smith v. Doe
(2003), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld Alaska’s Sex Offender
Registration law, setting a precedent for the constitutionality of various specialized sex
offender legislation. The opinion of the court, authored by Justice Kennedy, argued that
“a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism”
(Smith v. Doe, 2003). Although there is little or no support for this in the literature,
Kennedy cited his previously-written opinion for the case of McKune v. Lile (536 U.S.,
2002) as support. The opinion for McKune argued that the risk of recidivism posed by sex
offenders is “frightening and high” based on a statistic that up to 80% of sex offenders
will reoffend if left untreated (McKune v. Lile, p. 34, 2002). This single statistic set the
stage for justification of numerous policies that essentially force sex offenders to the
margins of society. This number stands in stark contrast to the estimated recidivism rates
discussed previously. Kennedy sourced this number from A Practitioner’s Guide to
Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender published by the U.S. Department of
Justice, National Institute of Corrections in 1988 (Schwartz & Cellini, 1988). The
publication references a large amount of statistics on sex offender recidivism rates from
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numerous sources, most of which range up to 10%, with only the one notable exception
claiming the recidivism rate to be as high as 80%. The source of this figure is an article
published in Psychology Today in 1986 (Freeman-Longo & Wall, 1986), written by the
operators of a sex offender counseling program, describing their program and its success
rates. With no evidence or elaboration, the authors wrote that “most untreated sex
offenders released from prison go on to commit more offenses – indeed, as many as 80
percent do,” a statement that was likely intended to promote the program, and possibly
had no empirical grounding.
Justice Kennedy’s dramatic language describing the recidivism rate for sex
offenders as “frightening and high”, has frequently been quoted by other court actors and
politicians in defense of sex offender laws and their consequences. In fact, a Lexis search
of legal materials found the phrase “frightening and high” in 91 judicial opinions, and in
briefs from over 100 cases (Ellman & Ellman, 2015). The Solicitor General’s brief from
Smith v. Doe is also full of assertions about sex offenders that are not supported by
research:
Sex offenders exact a uniquely severe and unremitting toll on the Nation
and its citizens for three basic reasons: “[t]hey are the least likely to be
cured”; “[t]hey are the most likely to reoffend”; and “[t]hey prey on the
most innocent members of our society.” United States Dept of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), National Conf. on Sex Offender
Registries (National Conf.) 93 (Apr. 1998).

Unfortunately, the Solicitor General’s language has also been quoted on
numerous occasions, relating to important matters including, for example, the preamble
to California’s Jessica’s Law, which attributes the quoted language only to a “1998 report
by the U.S. Department of Justice.” The information, again referenced simply to “a report
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by the United States Department of Justice,” was also utilized in an opinion by the
California Supreme Court (People v. Mosley, 2015), and has appeared in several local
ordinances in various states (Lave, 2008). The referenced Department of Justice report,
rather than containing any empirically derived evidence on sex offenders, is a summary
of conference speeches from advocates for sex offender registries (Ellman & Ellman,
2015). In fact, the Justice Department disavows any endorsement of the contents within
the report, and the speech from which the three points were taken offers no source for the
information (NCJIS, 1998).
Faulty beliefs about sex offenders and the nature of sex offenses are widespread
among the public and policy makers alike. Assumptions regarding recidivism rates
among those who commit a sexual offense, the prevalence of such crimes, and the
dangers presented by strangers have culminated in laws enforcing sex offender registries,
community notification, and residence restrictions. Unfortunately, these assumptions are
not supported by empirical research. The pervasiveness of these faulty beliefs has many
harmful outcomes to both sex offenders and society as a whole. The fact that laws are
being developed and implemented with a lack of empirical grounding is a serious
problem. Continuing to enforce such policies that are not evidence-based squanders
resources and increases risks to public safety. The following section will outline how sex
offender policies are failing to achieve the desired outcome of reducing sexual offending,
and result in collateral consequences that are linked to increased risks of recidivism.
1.3 LEGSILATION OUTCOMES & IMPLICATIONS
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Due to the lack of empirically supported rationale behind specialized sex offender
legislation, it is important to investigate the outcomes of these laws. Specifically, we
must consider whether they are attaining any significant reductions in sexual offending,
as they were developed and implemented to do, as well as consider what other
unintended effects may result. This chapter will review the literature on how these laws
impact the rates of sexual offenses as well as their resulting collateral consequences, then
conclude with a brief discussion of how collateral consequences are related to recidivism.
Recidivism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the specialized sex offender
legislation has not led to any meaningful reduction in sexual offending. Researchers have
focused largely on two specific areas of sex offender legislation: sex offender registration
and notification (SORN) and sex offender residence restrictions (SORR).
Numerous studies find no significant differences in sexual or non-sexual
reoffending after the implementation of SORN policies (Iowa Department of Human
Rights, 2000; Letourneau, Levenson, Bandyopadhyay, Sinha, & Armstrong, 2010;
Sandler, Freeman & Socia, 2008; Schram & Meloy, 2005; Tewksbury, Jennings &
Zgoba, 2012; Zgoba, Witt, Dalessandro & Veysey, 2008). The arbitrary means by which
different jurisdictions apply various levels of community notification has allowed
researchers to test for the impact of SORN laws controlling for the effect of any historical
event. For instance, Zevitz (2006) compared matched groups of sexual offenders who
were subjected to either minimal or high levels of community notification and found no
significant differences in recidivism, sexual or otherwise, indicating that community
notification does not work to reduce recidivism.
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It can be argued that SORN laws were implemented not only to have a specific
deterrence effect (i.e. decrease recidivism among registered sex offenders), but could also
deter first-time sexual offenders. Therefore, it is important to look at overall rates of
general sexual offending as well. An analysis of all registerable sexual offense arrest
records between 1986 and 2006 in New York state indicated that the SORN laws had no
impact on the occurrences of these crimes (Sandler, Freeman & Socia, 2008).
Furthermore, a trend analysis from New Jersey showed that overall sex offense rates have
been consistently declining since the mid 1980s, as have rearrests for both sexual and
nonsexual violent crime. Interestingly, the greatest rate of decline for sexual offenses
took place prior to the implementation of registration and notification laws (Zgoba, Witt,
Dalessandro & Veysey, 2008). Overall, the research on these policies suggests that
SORN laws are not able to reduce recidivism among sex offenders, as intended.
Unfortunately, investigations of the impact of SORR policies on recidivism
suggest their impact does not drastically differ from that of SORN laws. In fact, nearly all
studies indicate that residence restrictions are associated with increases in crime, rather
than decreases, whether considering sexual recidivism specifically, (Blood, Watson, &
Stageberg, 2008; Nobles, Levenson, & Youstin, 2012), or overall rates of sexual
offending (Nobles, Levenson, & Youstin, 2012; Socia, 2015). To determine whether the
apparent increases in sex crimes related to residence restrictions could be explained by
general increases in overall crime, Heubner and colleagues (2014) compared registered
offenders who were, and were not, subject to residence restrictions, with a control group
of matched non-sexual offenders in a quasi-experimental in Michigan and Missouri.
Their results refute the explanation of an overall crime rate increase, as the group of
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registered offenders was the only group to show increased rates of recidivism after the
SORR law was implemented (Huebner, Kras, Rydberg, Bynum, Grommon, &
Pleggenkuhle, 2014). The general conclusion from the sum of work in this area is that
SORN and SORR policies have not achieved their original purpose of preventing sexual
offending.
Collateral Consequences. In addition to their apparent failure to reduce sexual
offenses, specialized sex offender laws have resulted in several potentially harmful
collateral consequences. Researchers have identified social, economic, and psychological
issues resulting from SORN policies. Large amounts of registered offenders have
reported exclusion of residence (Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Tewksbury, 2005; Zevitz &
Farkas, 2000), being ostracized (Zevitz & Farkas, 2000), being threatened or harassed
(Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Tewksbury, 2005; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000), emotional harm
to family members (Zevitz & Farkas, 2000), loss of employment (Levenson and Cotter,
2005; Tewksbury, 2005; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000;), decreased support networks
(Tewksbury, 2005), increased pressure from probation/parole officer (Zevitz & Farkas,
2000;), and being physically attacked (Levenson and Cotter, 2005; Tewksbury, 2005;
Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). Levenson and Cotter (2005) also found that most offenders
reported that the law interfered with their recovery by causing more stress in their life,
feeling alone and isolated, fear for their safety, less engagement in activities due to shame
and embarrassment, feelings of hopelessness, and less hope for the future. Clearly, the
outcomes of sex offender registration and notification go far beyond those for which they
were intended.
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Similar unintended consequences have also resulted from residence restrictions.
For example, in a survey of registered sex offenders (Levenson, 2008), two thirds of the
participants reported financial suffering, and three quarters reported emotional distress.
Importantly, most of the respondents stated that the residence restrictions were not
practical or helpful, and would have no impact on their likelihood to reoffend (Levenson,
2008). Many of the respondents further stated that the isolation caused by the restriction
would increase their risk for recidivism (Levenson, 2008). Similar findings have been
reported using the same survey measure in New Jersey (Mercado, Alvarez, & Levenson,
2008), North Carolina (Page, 2012), and Florida (Levenson & Cotter, 2005). Jeglic,
Mercado, and Levenson (2011) also discovered that, on average, registered sex offenders
report mild to moderate levels of depressive symptoms and hopelessness, but those who
were negatively impacted by SORRs had significantly higher levels of depression and
hopelessness than others.
Aside from the emotional and psychological effects of SORRs, a shortage of
viable housing options for registered sex offenders is one of the most commonly reported
collateral outcomes of residence restriction policies (Barnes, Dukes, Tewksbury & De
Troy 2009; Berenson & Appelbaum 2011; Chajewski & Mercado, 2008; Socia, 2011;
Zgoba, Levenson & McKee 2009). Researchers have utilized spatial analysis to
determine the extent to which existing or hypothetical residence restrictions impact
housing availability for this population. Unsurprisingly, results indicate that large
majorities (even up to 100%) of registered offenders across diverse locations are living
within a “restricted zone” (Chajewski & Mercado, 2008; Barnes, Dukes, Tewksbury &
De Troy 2009; Zgoba, Levenson & McKee 2009). The size and scope of many SORRs
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leaves few housing options for registered sex offenders (Berenson & Appelbaum 2011;
Zgoba, Levenson & McKee 2009; Barnes, Dukes, Tewksbury & De Troy 2009), with
some cities having up to 97% of residentially zoned properties within a restricted zone
(Berenson & Appelbaum, 2011). The areas that are left available for RSOs are often less
densely populated, have less available housing, and less affordable housing (Socia, 2011;
Zgoba, Levenson & McKee 2009).
This shortage of housing has ultimately led to increasing levels of transience and
homelessness among this population. The California Sex Offender Management Board
(Loving, Singer & Maguire, 2008) reported that prior to the implementation of a
statewide residence restriction policy, there were 2,050 registered offenders recorded as
transient within the state. Within one year of implementation, those registered as transient
increased 60% to 3,267. Importantly, for the population of RSOs for whom the
restrictions were most consistently enforced, those on parole, the number of those
registering as transient increased over 800%, from 88 to 1,056 in the same time period.
Furthermore, registered offenders have been found to be at an increased likelihood of
being homeless compared to the general population (Levenson, Ackerman, Socia &
Harris 2015), the likelihood of an offender registering as transient is higher in
jurisdictions with residence restrictions than those without (Levenson, et al, 2015; Socia,
2015).
To examine the impact of SORRs separately from sex offender registration,
Tewksbury and Mustaine (2009) compared the types and extent of collateral
consequences experienced by RSOs who were, and were not, subject to residence
restrictions. They found that RSOs subject to residence restrictions were more likely to
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have been forced to move and to view housing problems as the biggest consequence of
being on the sex offender registry. Therefore, it seems unlikely that this outcome stems
from simply having to register as a sex offender, and that SORRs are indeed adding
additional strains above and beyond those caused by registration.
These findings are additionally supported by self-report surveys from diverse
samples of registered offenders across the country. In a survey from a single county in
Florida (which had both statewide and several local-level ordinance SORRs at the time)
42% of respondents reported being unable to return to their home upon release from
prison, and 55% reported being forced to move from a residence in which they were
living; 22% reporting having to move three times or more (Levenson, 2008).
Furthermore, nearly half reported being unable to live with a supportive family member,
and another 43% reported being unable to live with dependent family members. Overall,
17% reported being homeless, and nearly two thirds of the sample claimed that it was
difficult to find affordable housing due to the residence restrictions in their jurisdiction.
Moreover, 57% reported having to live farther away from employment opportunities,
41% had to live farther from social services and mental health treatment, and 27% had to
live farther from public transportation (Levenson, 2008).
Thus far, the research suggests that specialized sex offender laws do not decrease
sexual offending as intended, and they have produced numerous inadvertent outcomes
such as emotional suffering, financial strains, difficulty obtaining employment, and a lack
of available housing. The side-effects of the laws are unfortunate in and of themselves,
but the fact that many of them are linked to increased risks of recidivism is a serious issue
(Craig, Brown, & Beech, 2008; Hanson and Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005; Willis &
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Grace, 2008). These relationships imply the possibility that these laws could be serving to
increase the risk of reoffending, rather than the opposite.
Implications of Collateral Consequences. Factors that impact one’s risk of
recidivism have been examined among general and sexual offenders. Frighteningly, many
of the unintended outcomes of various sex offender laws discussed above have previously
been shown to increase risks of recidivism. For instance, researchers agree that stable
housing is an essential element of successful reintegration (Kubrain & Stewart, 2006;
Aylward, 2006; Willis & Grace, 2008; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005; Brennan,
Dieterich, Ehret & Beate, 2007). While no studies to date have specifically examined
homelessness as a direct influence on sexual reoffending, one study of community
reintegration found that registered offenders who did recidivate had significantly lower
scores on a measure of accommodation than those who did not (Willis & Grace, 2008).
Additional studies have identified links between unstable housing among offenders, and a
lack of social support and unemployment (Halsey, 2007); both of which are risk factors
for sexual reoffending (Hanson & Harris, 2000; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004,
2005). Other research has shown strong associations between transience and criminal
behavior. For example, roughly one quarter of individuals at a New York City shelter
were incarcerated within the previous two years (Metraux & Culhane, 2004, 2006), and
individuals who had been incarcerated tended to have spent longer times being homeless
than individuals who had not been incarcerated (Phelan & Link, 1999). Residential
instability has been significantly associated with recidivism (Brennan, Dieterich, Ehret &
Beate, 2007; Halsey, 2007), as well as absconding from supervision (Williams, McShane,
and Dolny, 2000). Furthermore, offenders released with no confirmed housing plan had
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an increased likelihood of returning to prison (Halsey, 2007). Notably, Meredith, Speir,
Johnson, and Hull (2003) discovered that each time a parolee changed residences, his or
her likelihood of re-arrest increased by twenty-five percent.
SORRs force registered offenders to live further from employment opportunities,
to be separated from supportive family members, and to experience emotional distress,
including depression and hopelessness (Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson, 2008;
Mercado, Alvarez, & Levenson, 2008; Page 2012; Jeglic, Mercado, and Levenson, 2011).
Research has also associated each of these outcomes with increased recidivism. Links
between unemployment and both sexual and general recidivism are supported by extant
research (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Hanson and Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005; Hanson
& Harris, 2000; Craig, Brown, & Beech, 2008; Willis & Grace, 2008; Brennan,
Dieterich, Ehret & Beate, 2007). Poor interpersonal relationships and lack of social
support have also been linked to recidivism (Hanson & Harris, 2000; Hanson & MortonBourgon, 2004, 2005; Craig, Brown, & Beech, 2008; Hanson, Harris, Scott & Helmus,
2007; and Halsey, 2007). Finally, the emotional distress and negative moods associated
with SORRs have been shown to increase risk of recidivism (Hanson & Harris, 1998,
2000; Craig, Brown, & Beech 2008).
Sex offender registration, notification, and residence restrictions were
implemented to reduce sexual offending by aiding the police in sex crime investigations,
enabling individuals to protect themselves and their children against known offenders,
and decreasing the accessibility of potential victims. Unfortunately, rather than serving
those intended purposes, these laws lead to various social, psychological, and economic
troubles for registered offenders, many of which increase the risk for recidivism.
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Homelessness, which has been associated with heightened recidivism among offenders in
general is one of the most highly reported outcomes of sex offender residence
restrictions. The next section outlines the sex offender legislation within South Carolina,
focusing on the residence restriction that was passed in 2011, in preparation for an
analysis of how this policy has impacted rates of homelessness and recidivism.
1.4 LEGISLATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The state of South Carolina implemented its sex offender registry in 1995, and its
sex offender residence restriction in 2011. Like most states, South Carolina’s registration
requirements extend beyond the federal guidelines. Specifically, the South Carolina
Codes of Laws provides that all offenders must register for life, with Tier 1 and 2
offenders registering biannually, and Tier 3 offenders registering every 90 days. (SCCOL
§ 23-3-460). Offenders must register not only in the county in which they reside, but also
in those in which they own property, are employed, and attend school (SCCOL § 23-3450). Penalties for non-compliance range from a fine of up to $1,000 and/or up to a year
in prison for a first-time offense, to mandatory imprisonment of 5 years for a third-time
or subsequent offense (SCCOL § 23-3-470). Information on all offenders who were over
the age of 12 at the time of the offense is available online to the public and may include
the offender’s name, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color,
permanent address, current address, place of employment, vehicle make, model, color,
and licence tag number, and internet identifiers (SCCOL § 23-3-530).
South Carolina state law also specifies that registered sex offenders who were
convicted of an offense against a minor are prohibited from residing within 1,000 feet of
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a school, daycare center, children’s recreational facility, park, or public playground
(SCCOL § 23-3-535). The restrictions, however, do not apply if the offender resided in
the restricted zone before the Act was passed, if the offender owned the property before
being charged with the crime that resulted with him/her being required to register, or if
the offender resided in the restricted zone prior to the establishment of the school or other
restricted area (SCCOL § 23-3-535). If an offender is found to be non-compliant with this
policy, he/she must vacate within 30 days. If the offender fails to do so, a first noncompliance offense is punishable by imprisonment up to 30 days and/or a fine of up to
$1,000, and third and subsequent offenses are punishable by imprisonment up to 5 years
and/or a fine of up to $5,000 (SCCOL § 23-3-535).
The state law prohibits local ordinances from having more lenient or more strict
penalties for non-compliance, as well as from increasing or decreasing the 1,000 foot
boundary around restricted zones (SCCOL § 23-3-535). Local ordinances, however, are
not limited in determining to which offenders the restrictions apply, or in regard to
selecting restricted locations. For instance, Columbia, the state’s capital, applies the
restrictions to all sex offenders, regardless of the age of the victim, and added churches,
school bus stops, and public pools to the list of restricted areas (COCCSC § 14-221).
Additionally, the local ordinance in Columbia restricts offenders not only from residing,
but also from loitering in these areas, which is defined as remaining idle in one location
with no apparent lawful purpose (COCCSC § 14-221). Finally, while the policy in
Columbia does include the grandfather clause that excludes those offenders who lived
within the restricted zone before the law was passed, it does not exclude offenders who
resided in the restricted zone prior to being charged (COCCSC § 14-221).
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Barnes, Dukes, Tewskbury, and De Troye (2009) investigated the potential
impacts of the residence restrictions in the state prior to implementation. By utilizing
spatial analysis, they identified current residential locations of sex offenders in relation to
the proposed restricted zones. They studied four of the six state counties with the highest
number of registered sex offenders, which provided a sample of 246 registered sex
offenders under the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services
(SCDPPPS). Offenders’ addresses were geocoded, as were addresses of schools and
daycare centers. Under the proposed 1,000 feet restriction rule, they found that roughly
20% of registered offenders would be affected. Perhaps the more interesting finding was
that nearly half of the counties’ unoccupied residential property would become restricted,
suggesting that sex offenders would be left with a few very specific areas to reside
throughout the state.
Barnes and colleagues (2009) likely underestimate the impact of the residence
restriction for several reasons. First, the sample only included offenders under the
supervision of SCDPPPS, but the state law is applied to sex offenders regardless of
supervision status. This means that the actual number of affected offenders is likely much
higher. Moreover, due to data availability, the analysis only included schools and daycare
centers as restricted areas, whereas the actual law includes many other areas such as
children’s recreational facilities, pars, and public playgrounds. If the analysis had
included all the restricted areas, it is likely that the results would have indicated many
more offenders were impacted. It is important to also note that the amount of restricted
unoccupied residential property is also likely greater than the reported 50% due to these
issues as well. Also of note, the state law only applies residence restrictions to offenders
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whose crimes involved a minor, yet Barnes et al.’s (2009) sample included offenders with
victims of all ages, which could lead to overestimation of the law’s impact. However,
many local ordinances do not limit the application of residence restrictions as the state
law indicates, so the impact of using all offenders in the sample is likely minimal.
Importantly, Barnes and colleagues (2009) highlight the large extent to which
unoccupied residential property is potentially unavailable to sex offenders across South
Carolina. Because local ordinances, such as Columbia, may not exclude from residence
restrictions those offenders who lived in a restricted zone prior to being charged, many
offenders will have to seek new residences upon release from prison. The lack of
available housing, and as suggested here by Barnes and colleagues (2009), leaves
registered sex offenders at an increased risk of homelessness. Due to stable housing being
identified as key to successful offender reintegration, and homelessness as a factor that
increases offenders’ risk of recidivism (Kubrin & Stewart, 2006; Aylward, 2006; Willis
& Grace, 2008; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005; Brennan, Dieterich, Ehret &
Beate, 2007), it is important to examine the effect of sex offender residence restriction
laws on rates of offender homelessness, and the extent to which homelessness impacts
rates of reoffending.
The current study will utilize data from the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division on all offenders from the State Sex Offender Registry to investigate whether
South Carolina’s sex offender residence restriction, implemented in 2011, has resulted in
increased rates of homelessness among this population, in addition to how homelessness
relates to reoffending for convicted sex offenders in South Carolina.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
2.1 DATA & SAMPLE
All data were obtained from the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
(SLED). While technically publicly available, all recorded information from the Sex
Offender Registry is not fully accessible online. Therefore, special access was granted
from SLED to obtain complete archived data files. The data was received in four separate
excel files; one containing an identification number, along with registrants’ names, dates
of birth, and dates of registration; the second containing registrants’ Tier level and
compliance status; the third containing each registrant’s current and past residential
addresses with their associated start and end dates; and the last file containing
information on registrants’ index and subsequent offenses including the crime code, date,
location, and sentence.
Because the impact of changes in registration are of primary concern, the
registration file served as the base file with a total 16,501 offenders listed. The relevant
data needed for analysis was gathered from the additional files and merged using the
identification number to link the data. First, data in the original registration file was
sorted by the identification numbers, and any listing without such identification were
deleted, bringing the sample size to 13,872. One hundred and eighty-one registrants had a
registration date prior to 1995. Since the sex offender registration was not implemented in

39

South Carolina until 1995, it was clear that those dates were recorded in error, so those
registrants were deleted from the sample. Finally, when the additional files were merged
to the base files, the sample was assessed for missing information on all other variables
and those with missing information were removed from the sample, resulting in a final
sample of 11,304 registrants.
Ages of participants ranged from 17 to 95 years old, with a mean age of 48 (SD =
12.38), and 2% of the sample was female. Most participants were Caucasian (59%) or
African American (39%), and a small amount were Hispanic (1%), American Indian
(.4%), Asian (.2%), or other (.6%). Of the participants, 832 (6%) were registered as a
juvenile. The final sample contained 40% Tier 1 offenders, 58% Tier 2 offenders, and 2%
Tier 3 offenders (described below).
2.2 MEASURES
Dependent variables. Recidivism was a binary measure of whether the offender
had at least one subsequent conviction after registering as a sex offender (0 = no
subsequent offenses; 1 = at least one subsequent offense). In the original data from
SLED, offenses were sorted by date, including offenders’ “primary” offenses for which
they were registered. To make the data more conducive for analysis, I sorted the data by
primary offense (yes/no) then rotated the data to be identified by person. If an offense had
a date that occurred after the offender’s primary offense, it was flagged as a “subsequent
offense”. If a registrant had at least one subsequent offense, they were marked with a one,
and those who had no additional offenses were marked with a zero.
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Independent variables. Homelessness was a binary measure of whether the
offender had ever been registered as homeless (0 = never had residence listed as
homeless; 1 = had at least one time period with residence listed as homeless). Because the
original data recorded homelessness among registrants’ addresses, all homeless listings
had to be identified and coded manually. To identify cases of homelessness, I ran a
frequency distribution on all registrants’ addresses, and manually identified all
“homeless” listings. The archived data file did not have a consistent method of recording
this information. Some offenders did indeed have “homeless” or some variation (i.e.
“home less”, “home-less”, “no home”, “no residence”, “no address”) recorded as an
address, while others were simply blank, or listed a P.O. box only. SLED indicated that
the latter could likely indicate that the offender was homeless, but also that it could have
been an error. For a conservative measure of this variable, only those who ever had an
address of “homeless”, (or an obvious variation), were coded as having ever been
homeless (1), and all other offenders were coded as not ever being homeless (0).
Duration of homelessness (in days) was calculated by determining the number of days
between an individual’s “start of address” and “end of address” dates for any listing of
homelessness, identified as outlined above. If the “homeless” address did not have an end
date, I interpreted this as the offender being currently homeless and calculated the
duration of homelessness with the “end of address” date as the date we obtained the data.
If an offender had more than one time-period listed as homeless, those durations were
added together.
Control variables. Duration of registration (in years) was determined by
calculating the difference between the date of registration and date of receipt of data.
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Compliance, (0 = no, 1 = yes) indicated whether the registrant was compliant with
updating his or her whereabouts at the mandated time periods (i.e. every six months for
Tier 1 and 2 offenders, and every 90 days for Tier 3 offenders). Tier level (Tier 1, Tier 2,
or Tier 3) indicated the severity of index offense, as specified by SORNA (see section 1.1
for description of Tier levels). Adult/juvenile (0 = juvenile, 1 = adult) indicated whether
the offender was a juvenile or adult at the time of his or her index offense. Finally, age
was determined by calculating the difference between date of birth, and date of receipt of
data, ethnicity was categorized into three groups (1 = Caucasian, 2 = African American, 3
= other), and sex was coded 0 for female and 1 for male.
2.3 ANALYTIC STRATEGY
To examine the impact of homelessness on recidivism, two binary logistic
regressions were conducted to assess if ever being homeless, and duration of
homelessness, could predict whether an offender had a subsequent offense after
registering as a sex offender. This analysis allows for the evaluation of the odds of
membership in one of the two outcome groups (those who have reoffended and those
who have not), based on the combination of predictor variable values. This statistical
analysis is appropriate when the purpose of the research is to assess if a set of
independent variables predict a dichotomous dependent variable (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll,
2002). This strategy can be used when the independent variables are continuous, discrete,
or a combination of continuous and discrete, such as the current analysis. Logistic
regression also assumes that each observation is independent, and that the model should
have little or no multicollinearity. This can be tested by calculating the Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF) for each predictor (Allison, 2012), as well as by simply investigating the
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Pearson’s r correlation values between these variables (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002).
Additionally, logistic regression assumes linearity of independent variables and log odds,
and requires a large sample size (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002). Evaluation of the logistic
regression model includes the overall model evaluation as well as an evaluation of each
individual predictor variable. The overall model significance will be examined using the
X2 omnibus test of model coefficients. The Nagelkerke R 2 will be examined to assess the
percent of variance accounted for by the independent variables. Finally, the impact of
each predictor variable will individually be assessed by considering the significance
value of Exp(), as well as the odds ratios.
In addition, an independent samples t-test was also employed to test whether
registrants who have been homeless had higher rates of recidivism than registrants who
had not been homeless. An independent samples t-test is an appropriate statistical test
when the purpose of the research is to assess if differences exist in a dependent variable
(recidivism) by a dichotomous independent variable (having been homeless, and not
having been homeless).
To test whether the residence restriction has increased the likelihoods of
homelessness and recidivism, two independent sample t-tests were conducted. The first
compared rates of homelessness, and the second compared rates of recidivism, between
offenders registered before 2011, when the residence restriction was implemented, and
those registered in 2011 and beyond. Again, an independent samples t-test is an
appropriate statistical test since the purpose is test for differences in a dependent variable
(homelessness and recidivism) by a dichotomous independent variable (registration preor post-2011).
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Individuals in the sample have been registered for an average of 10.40 years (SD
= 5.74), with 76% registering between 1995 and 2011, before the residence restriction
was implemented, and the remainder (24%) registering afterward. One hundred and
seventy-nine registrants (2%) were listed as homeless for at least one time period, and
duration of homelessness ranged from seven to 7,385 days (i.e., over 20 years), with a
median of 886 days (i.e., 2.4 years). Ten percent of those who had been homeless had an
address listed at a subsequent point, but the remainder of the group continues to be
homeless (for this group, duration of homelessness was calculated using the date of
receipt of data). Of those who have been homeless, 88% became homeless prior to 2011,
and 12% became homeless afterward.
Roughly 6% of the sample have been convicted of at least one subsequent offense
since being added to the registry. Of those who have reoffended, 72% have been
convicted of only one reoffense, 25% have been convicted of two or three reoffenses, and
4% have been convicted of four to seven reoffenses. Prior to 2011, there was a mean of
42.11 reoffenses per year. Since 2011, that number has increased to 48.86. Compliance
with registration requirements, adult/juvenile status at time of index offense, Tier level,
ethnicity, sex, age, and duration registered were included as control variables in the
analysis. A statistical description of these variables, including correlations, is available in
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Table 1. Notably, recidivism is positively correlated with homelessness, tier level, and
duration registered, and homelessness is inversely related to compliance status.
Research Question 1: Does Homelessness Predict Recidivism? An independent
samples t-test was also utilized to compare rates of recidivism between registrants who
had been homeless and those who had not. In support of the hypothesis, those who had
experienced homelessness (M = .11, SD = .31), were significantly more likely to
recidivate than those who had never been homeless (M = .06, SD = .23; t(11302) = -2.88,
p = .004).
To investigate this relationship in more detail and to control for covariates, two
binary logistic regressions and a t-test were conducted to explore how homelessness is
associated with recidivism. The first logistic regression tested the predictive ability of
ever having been homeless, the second tested the predictive ability of duration of
homelessness, and both models controlled for compliance, adult or juvenile registration,
Tier level, age, sex, ethnicity, and duration registered. Tests of multicollinearity indicated
only low levels of multicollinearity within the predictor variables (VIF = 1.01 for
homelessness, 1.01 for compliance, 1.02 for adult/juvenile, 1.01 tier level, 1.02 for race,
1.01 for sex, and 1.04 for age). Considering homelessness first, a test of the full model
against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors
as a set reliably distinguished between those who did, and those who did not recidivate
(chi square = 82.87, p < .001 with df = 8). Nagelkerke’s R of .021 indicated a weak to
modest relationship between prediction and grouping. The Wald criterion demonstrated
that homelessness made a significant contribution to prediction (p = .007), as did Tier
level (p < .001), age (p = .004), and time registered (p < .001). Exp() value indicated
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that when a registrant has spent time homeless, the odds ratio is 1.95 times greater.
Therefore, registrants who have been homeless are almost two times more likely to
recidivate, than those who have not been homeless. Moreover, for each increase in Tier
level, a registrant is 1.59 times more likely to recidivate; for every additional year of age,
a registrant is .01 times less likely to recidivate; and for each additional year registered, a
registrant is 1.04 times more likely to recidivate (see Table 2).
For the second model, testing duration of homelessness with the same control
variables was also statistically significant (chi square = 76.58, p < .001 with df = 8), and
had a slightly smaller Nagelkerke’s R of .019, which indicated a weak relationship
between prediction and grouping. The Wald criterion, however, indicated that duration of
homelessness was not a significant predictor in this model (p = .777). As expected, the
same control variables as the previous model were found to have significant predictive
ability in this model as well (see Table 3).
Overall, this set of analyses supports the hypothesis that homelessness is
associated with recidivism, although it appears that the experience of being homeless, is
an important factor, while duration of homelessness is not.
Research Question 2: Has the Likelihood of Being Homeless Increased Since
the Residence Restriction was Implemented in 2011? An independent-samples t-test
was conducted to compare experiences of homelessness between registrants who were
registered before 2011, and registrants who were registered after 2011, when the
residence restriction was implemented. In contrast to the hypothesis, there was no
significant difference in experiences of homelessness between those registered prior to
2011 (M = .02, SD = .13), and those registered afterward (M = .02, SD = .12; t(11302) =
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.08, p = .88). These results suggest that the period in which a registrant was registered
does not impact their likelihood of homelessness.
Research Question 3: Has the Likelihood of Recidivism Increased Since the
Residence Restriction was Implemented in 2011? An independent-samples t-test was
conducted to compare recidivism between registrants who were registered before 2011,
and registrants who were registered after 2011, when the residence restriction was
implemented. A significant difference was discovered in recidivism between those
registered prior to 2011 (M = .06, SD = .24), and those registered afterward (M = .04, SD
= .21; t(11302) = 3.18, p < .001), although in the opposite direction as hypothesized.
These results suggest that those registered before 2011 were more likely to recidivate
than those registered in 2011 and beyond.
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Table 3.1 – Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
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Variables

1

2

3

1. Reoffense flag

-

2. Homelessness flag

.027** -

3. Days homeless

.003

.699**

-

4. Compliant

-.012

-.067**

-.064**

-

5. Adult or Juvenile

.005

-.004

-.003

.019*

-

6. Tier level

.057** .004

-.027**

.058**

-.009

-

7. Ethnicity

.006

-.002

-.017

-.030**

.000

.040**

8. Sex

-.005

.008

-.017

.001

-.006

.028** .052**

-

9. Age

-.011

-.013

.002

.039**

.126**

.068** -.092**

.057**

-

10. Years registered

.054** .000

.025**

-.001

-.049**

.105** -.001

.031**

.233**

-

Mean

.057

.020

21.506

.970

.990

1.620

.463

.980

48.146

10.353

Standard deviation

.231

.125

242.681

.168

.090

.526

.635

.141

12.311

5.745

Range

0-1

0-1

7-7385

0-1

0-1

1-3

1-3

0-1

17-95

1-21

Skewness

3.834

7.758

18.757

-5.622

-10.890

-.075

1.595

-6.780

.269

3.834

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

-

Table 3.2 – Logistic Regression of Homelessness on Recidivism
Exp(B)

S.E.

Wald

Homelessness flag

1.951*

.248

7.264

Compliance

.728

.219

2.106

Adult or juvenile

1.884

.518

1.492

Tier level

1.585*

.080

32.733

Ethnicity

1.008

.067

.015

Sex

.806

.272

.626

Age

.990*

.004

8.086

Years registered

1.043*

.007

33.032

Constant

.025*

.629

34.239

*. Significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 3.3 – Logistic Regression of Duration of Homelessness on Recidivism
Exp(B)

S.E.

Wald

Days homeless

1.000

.000

.080

Compliance

.704

.218

2.585

Adult or juvenile

1.872

.518

1.465

Tier level

1.586*

.080

32.889

Ethnicity

1.008

.067

.013

Sex

.814

.272

.571

Age

.990*

.004

8.249

Years registered

1.043*

.007

32.827

Constant

.026*

.629

33.342

*. Significant at the 0.01 level.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
This study set out to explore the relationship between homelessness and
recidivism among registered sex offenders, as well as to investigate the effect of South
Carolina’s sex offender residence restriction on rates of homelessness and recidivism
among this population. Specifically, I hypothesized that homelessness among registered
offenders would be significantly associated with recidivism, and that rates of
homelessness, as well as rates of recidivism, would have increased since 2011, when the
state implemented its residence restrictions on this group of offenders.
In testing the link between homelessness and recidivism, a t-test showed that
recidivism is indeed significantly higher for the group of registrants that had experienced
homelessness, than the group that had not. Additionally, a logistic regression indicated
that homelessness is a significant predictor of recidivism among this sample, while
controlling for duration registered, compliance with registration requirements, adult or
juvenile registration, Tier level, age, sex, and ethnicity. Although the Nagelkerke’s R
value indicated that the overall model could only modestly predict recidivism at best,
homelessness was the most influential variable, with those who were homeless being
nearly twice as likely to recidivate. A separate logistic regression testing whether a
registrant’s duration of homelessness could predict recidivism was significant overall, but
determined that length of homelessness was not a significant predictor of recidivism.
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These results, taken in sum, suggest that any experience of homelessness, regardless of
duration, does indeed appear to be significantly associated with recidivism. An increasing
amount of time spent homeless, however, does not equate to an increased risk of
recidivism.
The association between homelessness and recidivism coincides well with
findings from other empirical research. While no other studies were found that
considered the direct impact of homelessness on recidivism for this particular group of
offenders, Willis and Grace (2008) found that an index measure of accommodation was
inversely related to recidivism among registered offenders. Unstable housing among
registered offenders has also been found to be linked to unemployment and a lack of
social support, both of which are risk factors for sexual reoffending (Hanson & Harris,
2000; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005; Halsey, 2007). Moreover, among
offenders in general, research has long supported a relationship between homelessness
and offending (Brennan, Dieterich, Ehret & Beate, 2007; Halsey, 2007; Speir, Johnson, &
Hull, 2003). For instance, individuals at homeless shelters are significantly more likely to
have committed a criminal offense than the general public (Metraux & Culhane, 2004,
2006), and individuals who have been incarcerated have a higher likelihood of having
been homeless than those who have not (Phelan & Link, 1999). Findings from the current
analysis provide additional support for the relationship between homelessness and
general offending, as well as bolster support for this relationship among sexual offenders
in particular.
Tier level also significantly predicted whether an offender would recidivate.
Specifically, for each increase in tier level, a registrant is 1.59 times more likely to
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recidivate. This information implies that although those in higher tiers present a
significantly greater threat to public safety, the increased risk of recidivism is not as
drastic as might be expected based on tier level. If the application of these policies differs
based on tier level, then tier levels should represent meaningful differences among
offenders’ levels of dangerousness. The current system of basing tiers on the perceived
severity of the crime for which an offender became registered doesn’t appear to result in
such meaningful distinctions, or at least not as much as one would hope. Perhaps a
system that considers other factors that have been found to contribute to an individual’s
risk of recidivism, such as criminal history, victim characteristics, social support, sexual
preferences, and relationship history (Hanson, 2004), would be better suited to categorize
offenders based on their dangerousness.
In investigating how South Carolina’s residence restriction has impacted rates of
homelessness among its registered offender population, the current analysis indicated no
significant difference in rates of homelessness among offenders registered between 1995
and 2011, and those registered between 2012 and 2016. Counter to my expectations, this
finding suggests that offenders who registered after the residence restriction was
implemented do not have an increased likelihood of homelessness compared to those
registered prior to the residence restriction implementation. Additionally, in exploring
whether the residence restriction had an effect on rates of recidivism, the analysis also
determined that, in contrast to the hypothesis, offenders registered after the
implementation of the residence restriction had a decreased likelihood of recidivism,
compared to offenders registered pre-implementation. One interesting finding of note,
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however, is that the average number of re-offences per year did increase from 42.11 to
48.86 after the residence restriction was put into place.
Counter to the findings of the current analysis, previous research has provided
ample support for a decrease in available housing for registered offenders following the
implementation of residence restrictions (Barnes, Dukes, Tewksbury & De Troy 2009;
Berenson & Appelbaum 2011; Chajewski & Mercado, 2008; Socia, 2011; Zgoba,
Levenson & McKee 2009), as well as for subsequent increases in homelessness
(Levenson, Ackerman, Socia & Harris 2015; Loving, Singer & Maguire, 2008; Socia,
2015). For example, Berenson and Appelbaum (2011) identified cities where up to 97%
of residentially zoned properties exist within a zone that is restricted to registered
offenders, and Loving, Singer, and Maguire (2008) reported that the number of offenders
on parole registering as transient increased by over 800% within one year of
implementation.
A large body of research has also shown that residence restrictions tend to
increase recidivism and overall sexual crime rates, rather than decrease such occurrences
(Blood, Watson, & Stageberg, 2008; Nobles, Levenson, & Youstin, 2012). Indeed, one
group of researchers compared recidivism between registered offenders who were and
who were not subject to residence restrictions, as well as a matched group of non-sexual
offenders, and discovered that only the group of registered offenders who were subjected
to residence restrictions had a significant increase in recidivism (Huebner, Kras, Rydberg,
Bynum, Grommon, & Pleggenkuhle, 2014).
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The discordance of this large body of evidence and the findings from the current
study could exist for a number of reasons. For example, the results could be interpreted as
suggesting that, in the present context, residence restrictions do not have a negative
impact on homelessness, and may even be associated with decreased recidivism.
However, the limitations of the available data and analytic strategy utilized likely negate
such conclusions. Specifically, while the use of archived data provides opportunities to
answer a plethora of research questions that would otherwise be impossible or impractical
to answer, and can save researchers years of painstaking data collection, it also comes
along with a number of important disadvantages. Specifically, the data may contain errors
or missing information, or the available variables may not be ideal to provide the answers
sought by researchers. In the current analysis, the sample had to be reduced by nearly a
third due to obviously faulty data, missing data, or ambiguous data. Moreover, because
the collecting agency did not have a consistent method for recording homelessness, it is
likely that many registrants who have been homeless were not recorded as such.
Moreover, it is likely that the residence restrictions were not applied equally to all
registrants in the sample due to variations between the state law and individual local
ordinances. As explained in the first chapter, South Carolina state law mandates that only
offenders who victimized a minor are subject to residence restrictions, and also includes a
grandfather clause excluding offenders who resided in a restricted zone before the law
was passed, who owned the property being charged with the registerable crime, and who
resided in the restricted zone before the restricted venue was established (SCCOL § 23-3535). Some local ordinances, though, do not include the same grandfather clauses, and
many also apply the law to all registered offenders, not only those who offended against a
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minor (COCCSC § 14-221). Furthermore, restricted locations differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. For example, the state law includes schools, daycare centers, children’s
recreational facilities, parks, and public playgrounds, whereas, the city of Columbia
restricts offenders from living near churches, school bus stops, and public pools as well
(COCCSC § 14-221). These variations between jurisdictions make it a challenge to
identify which registrants in the sample were indeed subject to the residence restrictions,
and to what degree.
In addition to the limitations of the available data, the analytic strategy utilized
may not have been the ideal method to test for the specific impact that South Carolina’s
residence restriction has on either homelessness or recidivism. With the available data,
homelessness and recidivism could only be compared between offenders who were
registered pre- and post-implementation, rather than between groups who were and were
not subject to residence restrictions. Although the group registered before 2011 would
have experienced varying amounts of time being registered without being subject to
residence restrictions, they all have also experienced five years with the residence
restrictions, as has the group to which they were compared, those registering post-2011.
Due to the grandfather clauses described above, however, it is plausible that individuals
in the group registered prior to 2011 were less likely to be subject to the residence
restrictions, although this cannot be said with certainty. Ultimately, comparing rates of
homelessness and recidivism between these groups could be somewhat of an arbitrary
comparison, since both groups have been subject to residence restrictions to an unknown
extent, making the present analysis a conservative one.
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While this study does not provide support for the notion that sex offender
residence restrictions increase homelessness and recidivism, it does add to the body of
evidence supporting a link between homelessness and recidivism. This relationship has
long been supported for offenders in general (Brennan, Dieterich, Ehret & Beate, 2007;
Halsey, 2007; Metraux & Culhane, 2004, 2006; Phelan & Link, 1999; Speir, Johnson, &
Hull, 2003), but this is the first study to directly test this relationship among registered
sex offenders. Investigating this association for this particular group is especially
important since a great deal of research has indicated that current sex offender policies,
such as registration, notification, and residence restrictions have led to heightened rates of
homelessness for this group (Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Levenson, Ackerman, Socia,
2015; Socia & Harris 2015; Loving, Singer & Maguire, 2008; Tewksbury, 2005; Zevitz
& Farkas, 2000). The results of this study indicate that offenders who spend any amount
of time homeless are almost twice as likely to recidivate than offenders who have not.
Programs and policies that work toward ensuring stable housing for this population could
drastically reduce rates of recidivism among registered offenders, and policy makers
should make this a priority. Likewise, policies that decrease available housing and
increase rates of homelessness, such as sex offender registration and residence
restrictions should be modified or eliminated immediately.
Unfortunately, these laws are often justified by false beliefs of high recidivism
rates among registered offenders (i.e. Smith v. Doe, 2003; McKune v. Lile, 2002; see
Ellman & Ellman, 2015). Although not a main objective of this project, the finding that
only 6% of the sample had committed a reoffense after being registered is an important
one, and adds to the evidence that registered offenders are quite unlikely to recidivate,
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especially in comparison to general offenders who have been estimated to recidivate at a
rate of 68-77% (Durose, Cooper, & Snyder, 2014). Previous research estimates that 325% of sex offenders will recidivate (Greenfeld, 1997; Harris & Hanson, 2004;
Kruttschnitt, Uggen, & Shelton, 2000; Zimring, Piquero, & Jennings 2007), and the
current finding increases support to the lower end of these estimates. Sex offender
recidivism rates were declared to be “frightening and high” by the United States Supreme
Court (McKune v. Lile, p. 34, 2002), and this notion has been used repeatedly in the legal
realm to justify these specialized sex offender policies (Ellman & Ellman, 2015). In
reality, this group of offenders is offending at a substantially lower rate than offenders in
general (Durose, Cooper, & Snyder, 2014), and it is imperative that this information be
accurately considered in legal policy making. This low rate of recidivism reveals that
these drastic measures to reduce recidivism that have been shown to have negative
collateral consequences are not only unreasonable, but also unjustifiable.
With the growing amount of empirical evidence that indicates the faultiness of
residence restrictions and other sex offender policies, it is curious and troubling that law
makers continue to create and support such policies. Future research should consider
what factors influence policy makers to take empirical evidence into account when
developing laws for the management of sex offenders, as well as ways in which we can
encourage these actors to strive to develop evidence-based policies. Additionally, because
current sex offender registries include individuals convicted of such a variety of offenses,
it is important to gain a better understanding of the actual conduct that lands individuals
on the registry. This information could help guide future modifications of registration
laws to ensure that policies are aimed at offenders who will actually be deterred from
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reoffending by them, rather than unnecessarily punishing those to whom the laws are
irrelevant. Of course, since this is the first project that directly tested the relationship
between homelessness and sex offender recidivism, future research should continue to
investigate this relationship within this group to increase support for this finding. Finally,
future replications should examine if this relationship differs by race, sex, age, and other
demographic variables, to ensure policies are being correctly targeted.
Legitimate sexual offenses are clearly a horrendous type of crime for anyone to
experience, and surely governments should be taking steps to prevent their occurrence.
Unfortunately, high levels of public concern that follow publicized sexual victimization,
combined with faulty assumptions regarding those who commit sexual offenses have led
to impulsive development of laws that are not based on research (Levenson & D’Amora,
2007; Maguire & Singer, 2010). What’s worse, these laws that are intended to reduce
such offenses, have been found to either have no impact (Adkins, Huff, Stageberg, Prell
& Musel, 2000; Letourneau, Levenson, Bandyopadhyay, Sinha, & Armstrong, 2010;
Sandler, Freeman & Socia, 2008; Schram & Meloy, 2005; Tewksbury, Jennings &
Zgoba, 2012; Zgoba, Witt, Dalessandro & Veysey, 2008), or even increase their rates
(Blood, Watson, & Stageberg, 2008; Huebner, Kras, Rydberg, Bynum, Grommon, &
Pleggenkuhle, 2014; Nobles, Levenson, & Youstin, 2012; Socia, 2015). What began as a
means for law enforcement to track individuals who had previously committed a sexual
offense to aid in investigations, has evolved into an elaborate list of individuals who have
committed a range of crimes, many of which lack sexual intent and pose very little, if
any, threat to the public. Additional laws now require public dissemination of offenders’
information, as well as limit where an offender can live. Alas, no logical basis for these
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laws exist. The large majority of sexual offenses involve victims already known to the
offender (Maguire & Singer, 2010; Petrosino & Pertrosino, 1999; Snyder & Sickmund,
2006; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2006), so warning the public of an offender in the area is
unlikely to foster prevention. Moreover, offenders are unlikely to seek potential victims
at the locations targeted with residence restrictions (Calkins, Colombino, Matsuura, &
Jeglic, 2015; Catalano, 2005; Donnay & Tuwksbury, 2008; Snyder, 2000) and no
evidence has been found to support a link between residential proximity to such locations
and recidivism (Maguire & Singer, 2010; Zandbergen, Levenson, & Hart, 2010). Even
with findings that suggest these registration policies work counterproductively,
jurisdictions continue to implement these laws. South Carolina recently implemented a
state-wide 1000-foot residence restriction for registered offenders whose offense included
a minor (SCCOL 23-3-535). Utilizing data from the state sex offender registry, the
current analysis discovered that this law may not have impacted rates of homelessness or
recidivism, but it did support the existence of a relationship between homelessness and
recidivism. As support for this association continues to grow and we gain a
comprehensive understanding of the outcomes of specialized sex offender laws, perhaps
policy makers will rethink these laws and alter them to reflect empirical evidence on the
nature of sexual offending. With the implementation of evidence-based policies,
hopefully we will see meaningful reductions of these unfortunate events.
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